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Education Policy Networks in a comparative perspective:  
Germany, Switzerland, Great Britain and New Zealand 
ABSTRACT 
International initiatives in education, such as PISA and the Bologna Process, have dis-
tinctly changed conditions framing domestic policy-making. This paper sheds light on 
the territorial and modal dispersion of national education policy networks by means of a 
systematic network analytical description. The focus is on changing patterns of interac-
tions and coalitions between international and national as well as private and public 
actors. Therefore, we analyse four countries, i.e. Germany, Switzerland, Great Britain 
and New Zealand, in a comparative perspective. The findings show that in most coun-
tries there is indeed an internationalization of education politics taking place in the 
sense of an increasing participation of international actors. These actors apply a more 
and more diversified portfolio of governance instruments. At the same time, however, 
domestic veto players develop a rich set of strategies to cope, compete or collaborate 
with international actors.  
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Education Policy Networks in a comparative perspective:  
Germany, Switzerland, Great Britain and New Zealand 
INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
PISA, Bologna, Bruges and Copenhagen, what sounds like the route of a wandering 
humanist, such as Erasmus of Rotterdam, is in our days an unmistakable evidence for 
the internationalisation of education politics. Being a traditional domain of the nation 
state, the political responsibility for education is now increasingly dispersed between 
regional, national and international as well as public and private actors (Leuze et al. 
2007). Perhaps most prominently, PISA and the Bologna Process stand for processes of 
internationalisation in education. PISA is an internationally standardised assessment by 
the OECD administered to a sample of 15-year-olds in participating countries’ schools. 
Whereas in the first PISA round in 2000 a total of 43 countries participated, 67 coun-
tries are already registered for the assessment in 2009/10. Regarding higher education 
the Bologna Process is an intergovernmental initiative which aims at establishing a 
European Higher Education Area. In 1998 four European countries signed the so called 
Sorbonne Declaration. Since then, the number of participating countries has grown to a 
total of 46. With the ministerial conference in Berlin 2003, the Bologna Process has 
been linked to the EU’s Lisbon Agenda of making the EU ‘the most dynamic and com-
petitive knowledge-based economy in the world’ by 2010 (Berlin-Communiqué 2003). 
In short, both PISA and the Bologna Process distinctly changed conditions framing do-
mestic policy-making. It is the aim of this paper to shed light on the territorial and mo-
dal dispersion of national education policy networks by means of a systematic network 
analytical description. The central research question therefore is how the interactions 
and coalitions between international and national as well as private and public actors 
have changed (both qualitatively and quantitatively) within the last decade, thus to ac-
count for changes in national education policy making. The descriptive enterprise refers 
to four case-studies, i.e. Germany, Switzerland, Great Britain and New Zealand, which 
will subsequently be put in a synoptic and comparative perspective. The research aim of 
this paper is to yield some explanations as to the influence of international organizations 
on national education policy making and the capacity of national veto players to cope 
with that interference. 
The network-study to be presented here is part of a more comprehensive research 
project on “the internationalisation of education politics”. Therefore it stands within a 
broader theoretical framework: Generally we assume that international organizations 
trigger changes in national education policy making by a rich set of governance instru-
ments, whereas these changes can be both hindered or fostered by national veto players. 
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Hence, IOs and their respective instruments are treated as independent variable, national 
education policy making as dependent variable and veto players as an intervening vari-
able (for a more detailed description of the underlying theoretical concepts see Leuze et 
al. 2008)). Within this framework it is hold that an internationalisation of education 
politics, i.e. an accumulation of governance capacities at IOs, should result in changes 
of national education policy making. The probability and/or degree of these changes 
should depend on the extent to which a country is exposed to IO-governance as well as 
its inherent political barriers, such as veto players or veto points (ibid, 19-21).  
Table 1: Theoretical Sampling 
Intervening variable  
Few veto players Many veto players 
Exposed to OECD only New Zealand Switzerland Independent 
variable Exposed to OECD and EU Great Britain Germany 
 
According to our theoretical assumptions, changes in education policy making should 
be maximal in Great Britain – as the exposure to IOs is relatively strong while there are 
only a few national veto points or players – whereas it should be minimal in Switzer-
land, which is less exposed to IOs and characterized by a highly federal system of deci-
sion making. Basically, change of national education policy making may occur in two 
dimensions: policies and politics. The dimension of policies encompasses changes in 
the contents of education politics, i.e. its goals, instruments and settings. In contrast, the 
dimension of politics refers to the process of decision making itself, i.e. its modes and 
the actors involved (ibid, 2-3).  
This is where the network perspective comes in. Before turning to the empirical sec-
tion, some theoretical remarks with regard to policy networks should be outlined. As 
policy network approaches generally set out to decompose complex processes of deci-
sion making in so called “dyads” – distinct relationships between two actors – they 
seem to be especially suitable to discover change in the dimension of education politics. 
Comparative analysis of policy networks is still quite rare and so is the network analy-
sis of structural change. The first step in the comparative study of policy networks was 
to analyse and compare policy networks within a nation state. A cutting-edge piece of 
work in that respect was the study from Edward Laumann and David Knoke on the 
“Organizational State” (Laumann and Knoke 1987). Here, the authors compare the pol-
icy fields of health and energy and develop a concept of public-private decision making 
which is both theoretically plausible and empirically manageable in terms of social net-
work analysis. On this foundation Knoke and others embarked on a more comprehen-
sive endeavour as they compared labour policy networks across Germany, Japan and the 
United States (Knoke et al. 1996). It was a particular strength of these ground-breaking 
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studies to combine conceptual assumptions as to the network-structure of modern, plu-
ralist decision making with tangible network analytical empirics. Yet, from a perspec-
tive of internationalisation it can be considered a desideratum that they did not touch 
issues of multi-level governance (Bache and Flinders 2004; Nagel 2009, in print). 
Moreover, in recent years there has been a vivid methodological debate on how to 
model structural change and network dynamics (Suitor et al. 1997). Although the dy-
namic perspective has extensively been applied to interpersonal networks (e.g. Feld 
1997; Wellmann et al. 1997) change in policy networks has been neglected so far. This 
is all the more surprising as interaction patterns in these networks can be held to be 
more precarious due to the instrumental orientation of the corporative actors involved: 
“An iterative gaming strategy develops, in which organizations continually shuffle from 
coalition to coalition in opportunistic pursuit of advantage (Laumann and Knoke 1987: 
386). 
For a structural analysis of the internationalization of education politics and its im-
pact on national policy networks both the phenomenon of multi-level governance and 
the aspect of change need to be taken into account. In some countries, such as Germany 
or Switzerland, education policy has been a two-level game for quite some time due to 
their cultural federalism (Braun 2004; Wolf 2006). Former network approaches dealt 
with federalist systems in a pragmatic way as they included federal actors as one distinct 
type of interest groups or state departments among others (Laumann/Knoke 1987: 99; 
Knoke et al. 1996: 73). Thus, it seems appropriate to treat international or European 
organizations likewise and to conceive them as a special type of interest group within 
national education policy networks. The advantage of such a virtual expansion of the 
network boundaries is that interactions and coalitions across the territorial axis can be 
covered at all. The price for such a broadening of scope, however, is the disguise of 
relational complexity within the international or subnational sphere. The extrapolation 
of network change, finally, is a methodical rather than a conceptual challenge and will 
be dealt with in the following section. 
METHODICAL REMARKS AND OPERATIONALIZATION 
To account for the impact of international and European Actors in national policy net-
works we need relational data sensitive enough to reflect various governance instru-
ments (i), abstract enough to allow for cross-country comparisons (ii) and dynamic in 
order to consider structural changes (iii). 
To compile such data we used a mixed-method design combining quantitative con-
tent analysis and network analysis (Nagel 2008; Seibel and Raab 2003). In a first step 
we studied hyperlink-networks of actors likely to be involved in education policy mak-
ing for each country, drawing a snowball sample from the respective national ministries 
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of education. In a second step we compiled a corpus of texts for each country whereas 
the number of documents was weighed by the prevalence of actors in the hyperlink net-
works. In a third step we created a codebook for each country to operationalize our gen-
eral comparative categories of actors with regard to the national policy network in ques-
tion. In a fourth step we performed a computer-based search for all organizations in the 
codebook. The resulting retrievals were scanned manually for relational contents, such 
as ‘organization A does something to organization B’ and interpreted according to a 
given scheme of political interaction in policy networks. Finally, this collection of dy-
ads was compiled into actor-by-actor-matrices to apply quantitative means of network 
analysis. 
Obviously, the categorization of actors and relations is a crucial step to operational-
ize our research question for a comparative network analysis. On the one hand, catego-
ries have to be abstract enough to cover the characteristics of all four countries; on the 
other hand they need to be as concrete as to allow substantial insights with regard to 
national decision making and its changes. Generally, nodes within the network represent 
types of (corporate) actors whereas lines represent types of relations between them. In 
the following we use a total of 16 categories of actors and 6 categories of relations, 
which are derived from earlier studies and pre-tests (Nagel 2006; Nagel 2008). As mul-
tiple levels of policy-making are concerned, the categories of actors encompass interna-
tional organizations, especially the OECD, European and Bologna-Process Actors (EU 
and BFUG), state actors (e.g. national and federal ministries, parliaments) as well as 
public (e.g. universities) and private interest groups (e.g. economy representatives and 
labour unions).1 Moreover, we assume that political interactions between these actors 
can be conducted by a set of different relations. Information relations are characterized 
by knowledge transfers in the policy network. This knowledge may either be related to 
processes of policy-making (procedural) or to specific policy issues (substantial). 
Transaction relations are similar to the first type, but indicate exchange or transfer of 
material goods or services in a more or less monetary form. Thirdly, relations of sym-
bolic affirmation are characterized by the spontaneous or institutionalized transfer of 
institutional and symbolic capital. Relations of cooperation represent a general collabo-
ration between corporative actors. In contrast, lobby relations encompass purposeful 
and instrumental intervention of actors on others within the policy network in question. 
                                                 
1
  More precisely, the 16 categories are structured as follows: International organizations, European and Bologna 
actors, Third States, National State Actors, Federal State Actors, Parties and Legislative Actors, Quality Assur-
ance Agencies, Universities, Research Agencies, Student Representatives, Professional Associations, Public In-
terest Groups, Economy Representatives, Labor Unions, Schools and Teachers and Training Agencies, (for a 
more detailed desciption of the categories see Nagel 2006).  
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Finally, power relations apply to the exertion of formal authority. They are similar to 
lobby relations as an actor is prompted to act in a certain way.     
These categories of relations reflect strategies of political intervention also known as 
governance instruments. In our theoretical considerations we distinguish a number of 
instruments international actors can make use of to influence national education politics: 
Discursive dissemination, standard setting, financial means, coordinative activities and 
technical assistance (Leuze et al. 2008: 8-9). Out of these governance instruments dis-
cursive dissemination may be operationalized by relations of symbolic affirmation re-
flecting affirmative speech-acts and discursive empowerment. Governance by financial 
means can be measured by relations of transaction while governance by standard-setting 
can be duly operationalized by relations of control reflecting binding prescription. As 
the focal point of our analysis are national policy networks governance instruments are 
not restricted to international actors only. Instead, national veto players or interest 
groups may also apply governance instruments to realize their interests in the process of 
decision making. Such an operationalization is consistent with earlier network-
analytical approaches, e.g. the distinction of “stick”, “carrot” and “sermon” as ideal-
typical strategies of intervention (Burth and Starzmann 2001: 54) or the differentiation 
of enforcement, incentive and persuasion (Howlett and Ramesh 1993: 255). Here, rela-
tions of control resemble the option of stick or enforcement, relations of transaction 
resemble the option of carrot or incentive while relations of symbolic affirmation re-
semble the option of sermon or persuasion.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this section we will present comparative network-analytical evidence with regard to 
the macro-, meso- and micro-structure of the education policy networks in Germany, 
Switzerland, Great Britain and New Zealand. On the macro-level we will illustrate how 
the patterns and modes of political interaction have changed since international and 
European actors have entered the arena of education policy making. Here, special em-
phasis will be given to variations across the four countries to account for a potential 
convergence or divergence of domestic education politics. On the meso- and micro-
level in contrast we will have a closer look on international organizations and national 
veto-players and their social environment. 
Structural Change 
We assume that political decision making is a multiplex process which encompasses 
both formal and informal, manifest and discursive relations. Changes in the distribution 
of these relations can account for variation in the modes of political interaction. Figure 2 
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illustrates the composition of the education policy networks in our four countries at two 
periods of time (1997-2003 and 2004-2007): 
Figure 1: Modes of political interaction 
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At a very first glance there is quite some variance within and across countries whereas 
variation across countries is more visible than within. To give an example of reading: In 
Germany the education policy network at first is mainly made up by relations of coop-
eration (about one third), lobbyism (about one quarter) and symbolic affirmation (about 
one fifth). In contrast, relations of information, transaction and control are less preva-
lent. In the second period of time, there is an expansion of cooperation and transaction 
and a reduction of lobbyism. Thus, the general mode of decision-making in education 
policy in Germany changes from political argument to collective action, which may be 
an expression of the policy cycle having advanced from programme formulation to im-
plementation.  
If we look at similarities and differences between countries by means of pair com-
parison referring to the number of veto players the education policy networks in Great 
Britain and New Zealand are characterized by a higher share of cooperation and a lower 
share of control and lobbyism than Germany and Switzerland. The latter represent po-
litical systems with a relatively high number of veto-players in a federal arrangement 
whereas decision making in Great Britain and New Zealand is more centralised and 
there are only a few veto-players. Therefore, the number and power of veto-players is 
reflected in the patterns of political interaction: the more veto-players, the more need to 
exert influence on other actors (lobbyism) and to regulate decision making in a hierar-
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chical manner (control). The less veto-players on the other hand, the more need for col-
lective action on a more mutual yet less institutionalised level. Taking a closer look at 
the statistical evidence of this pair comparison, however, it becomes obvious, that the 
impact of veto-players on the modes of political interaction should not be overestimated 
as the respective differences in percentage are rather low. Regarding change the dispari-
ties between the two pairs of countries tend to persist (and even increase) over time, 
which yields to a slight sigma-divergence. 
A second pair comparison refers to the degree of exposure to international organiza-
tions. In our theoretical framework we hypothesized that education politics in Germany 
and Great Britain would be more likely to change for these countries are exposed both 
to the OECD and to the EU as well as the Bologna-Process. Switzerland and New Zea-
land in contrast, are members of the OECD only and should therefore be able to pre-
serve national structures to a higher extent. With regard to the patterns of political inter-
action, however, there is not as visible a difference as with regard to veto-players. In the 
first period (1997-2003) the policy networks in Germany and Great Britain show a 
lower share of lobbyism and slightly higher share of cooperation and control, in the sec-
ond period (2004-2007) we can account for assimilation with regard to lobby relations, 
reversion with regard to cooperation and continuity with regard to control. These am-
biguous results allude that the exposure of nation states to international organizations 
(measured by the number of memberships) does not affect the general patterns of do-
mestic decision making in the area of education in our sample. Instead, the variation 
within the pairs of countries is considerably higher than between the pairs. In fact, Swit-
zerland and New Zealand prove to be most dissimilar cases as to the composition of 
their respective policy networks: whereas the share of cooperation in New Zealand is 
almost twice as high as in Switzerland, the latter shows a significantly higher share of 
relations of control. Obviously, the impact of domestic structures of decision making, 
such as a federal system and the prevalence of veto-players superposes the effect of a 
country being member in one or more international organizations. 
The composition of education policy networks as to the modes and patterns of politi-
cal interaction can provide some general evidence about changes or continuity of na-
tional education politics. A comparison of shares of several relational dimensions across 
countries and across time has shown that a) there has only been little change in national 
education politics within the last decade, b) variation between countries is and (has 
been) bigger than within and c) the modes of political interaction depend on domestic 
structures of decision making rather than membership in international organizations. 
Thus, the composition of national education policy networks can be characterized by 
path-dependency and continuity rather than change: political culture prevails over inter-
national impulses. 
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Aside from the modes of interaction network analysis can account for other structural 
traits of education policy networks, such as the density and centralization of political 
interaction. Density is defined as the ratio of all factual to all possible relations (Jansen 
2003: 108; Wasserman and Faust 2007: 101). Dense networks are more egalitarian in 
the sense that more actors have access to the resources of more other actors, which im-
pedes a monopolization of power positions. In contrast, (degree-based) centralization 
refers to the structuration of network interaction around one prominent actor and thus 
reflects its hierarchical structure. Subsequently, a discordant change of density and cen-
tralization may indicate a more inclusive (more dense, but less centralized) or exclusive 
(less dense, but more centralized) character of a network. Table 2 provides an overview 
about these measures for all countries and relational dimensions and their variation over 
time: 
Table 2:  Strucutral Change, Synopsis 
Country Measures D CH GB NZ 
Time  t1 t2 t1 t2 t1 t2 t1 t2 
Density 0,08 0,10 0,07 0,10 0,02 0,06 0,04 0,09 Information 
Centralization (od) 0,20 0,25 0,28 0,24 0,05 0,15 0,24 0,40 
Transaction Density 0,08 0,15 0,10 0,08 0,11 0,18 0,07 0,13 
Density 0,18 0,30 0,15 0,21 0,10 0,27 0,14 0,20 Symbolic  
affirmation Centralization (od) 0,44 0,32 0,48 0,70 0,25 0,43 0,35 0,43 
Density 0,36 0,41 0,23 0,21 0,28 0,53 0,34 0,40 Cooperation 
Centralization (d) 0,43 0,45 0,34 0,44 0,53 0,47 0,56 0,53 
Density 0,16 0,19 0,12 0,13 0,10 0,16 0,07 0,13 Lobbyism 
Centralization (id) 0,18 0,51 0,30 0,28 0,39 0,47 0,36 0,57 
Density 0,03 0,06 0,06 0,09 0,05 0,06 0,03 0,06 Control 
Centralization (od) 0,18 0,36 0,22 0,13 0,24 0,50 0,32 0,44 
(od = outdegree-based centralization; id = indegree-based centralization; d = degree-based centralization) 
 
In the columns of the table there are our four countries observed in two periods of time 
(1997-2003 and 2004-2007). The columns highlighted in grey represent countries less 
exposed to the influence of international organizations while the framed columns repre-
sent countries with a high number of veto-players as to our theoretical sampling. In all 
countries and in nearly all relational dimensions there is a concordant increase of den-
sity and centralization. Thus, during the last decade the arena of national education poli-
tics has somewhat expanded, e.g. by private and international actors becoming increas-
ingly involved. This expansion, however, does not lead to a more egalitarian setting, but 
fosters internal structuration, a process which could be classified as ‘second-order ex-
clusion’. 
A glance at the distinct relational dimensions reveals some similarities in the struc-
tural constitution of education policy networks across all countries: political interaction 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 103) 
- 9 - 
in the dimensions of symbolic affirmation, cooperation and lobbyism appears to be 
more intense and comparably less hierarchical than relations of information, transaction 
and control.2 Obviously, the political arena consists of two different spheres: the first 
sphere is inclusive and characterized by elusive discursive interaction of persuasive 
(symbolic affirmation) or appellative shape (lobbyism) and unspecific cooperation. In 
contrast, the second sphere is exclusive and characterized by specific and more institu-
tionalised relations, such as the transfer of money, information and directions within a 
given chain of command. Thus, the inclusion of new actors and the general expansion 
of interaction in the field of education politics do not necessarily imply enhanced par-
ticipation (and hence a boost of democratic quality). Neither, however, do they indicate 
a subversive shift of political authority from national states to interest groups of doubt-
ful provenience. Instead, processes of internationalization and privatization of education 
politics seem to foster functional differentiation within the actor-set, an observation 
which will be of further interest in the following subsection. 
Before turning to subgroup analysis, however, we want to take a closer look at the 
patterns of change across our countries with respect to density and centralization. Fig-
ure 3 illustrates the change of density in all countries and relational dimensions: 
Figure 2: Change of Density 
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At a first glance, the diagram underlines our previous observation of an overall increase 
of density across all countries and relational dimensions. The degree of change, how-
ever, differs distinctly across countries. Most remarkable in this respect is the education 
policy network in Great Britain where intensity and thickness of political interaction 
                                                 
2
  This observation refers to the ratio of the centralization index and the density.  
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have risen considerably between the two time periods. New Zealand and Germany ex-
hibit a moderate change whereas Switzerland shows only little and heterogeneous al-
teration. These results are perfectly in line with our theoretical assumptions as we ex-
pected the British education policy network to be most affected by processes of interna-
tionalisation due to its high exposure to international organizations (OECD and EU) and 
its relatively small number of national veto-players. On the other hand, we held that 
changes in education politics should be minimal in Switzerland due to its low exposure 
to international organizations and the big number of veto-players in its cantonal system. 
Finally, both Germany and New Zealand were to exhibit moderate change as they are 
either more (Germany) or less (New Zealand) exposed to internationalization and na-
tional veto-players. Obviously, the constellation of veto-players and international or-
ganizations makes a difference with regard to the intensity of political interaction: the 
membership of a country in international organizations creates channels of interaction 
and legitimates interference. The prevalence of veto-players, however, may be apt to 
counterbalance this effect be it due to actual exertion of veto-power or due to the higher 
degree of competition in the process of decision making in general. 
The previous results from a comparative analysis of the density of national education 
policy networks underline the capacity of our theoretical framework to explain struc-
tural changes of national education politics. The following figure illustrates changes of 
centralization in these networks and thus points to internal structuration and hierarchy 
as other important structural dimensions: 
Figure 3: Change of Centralization 
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The diagram shows changes in (degree-based) centralization between two periods of 
time for all countries and all relational dimensions. Even at a very first glance it be-
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comes obvious that the internal structuration of political interaction in the field of edu-
cation develops in a more heterogeneous way than its general vitality and intensity. If 
we build a change indicator by summing up the absolute values of relational dimensions 
and weigh it by their prevalence it shows that alterations in network centrality are more 
visible in Germany and Great Britain than in Switzerland and New Zealand. This obser-
vation does not match our expectation that education politics were about to change most 
in Great Britain and least in Switzerland. Yet, a tentative explanation may be achieved 
by pair comparison: As to our theoretical framework Germany and Great Britain are 
similar in being more exposed to international organizations than the other two coun-
tries. Hence, with regard to the internal structuration of national education policy net-
works international organizations seem to cause more change than domestic veto-
players are able to impede. As pointed out earlier, the general direction of these changes 
clearly is a centralization of the decision making process, i.e. an increase of hierarchical 
interaction. Thus, increasing exposure of national education politics to international 
actors claiming legitimate interference fosters not only an expansion (s.a.), but also a 
closure of political interaction. From a macro-perspective such evidence remains but 
ambivalent: it may point to a viral intrusion and usurpation of national policy networks 
by international organizations replacing domestic actors at their very centre or to na-
tional actors closing ranks and forming a laager against the international level. Here, 
network analysis on the level of subgroups (meso-perspective) and single actors (mico-
perspectives) promise further insights. 
Subgroups and Positions  
In terms of network analysis subgroups or cliques are cohesive constellations of actors 
which are reciprocally tied to one another. The formal characteristics of such groups are 
intensive interior interaction, social closure and symmetry (Jansen 2003: 194-5). While 
the assumption of symmetry seems reasonable for the study of personal networks, such 
as friendship or support, the analysis of policy networks calls for a broader understand-
ing. In the following, subgroups represent closed units of political interaction which 
may as well be asymmetric. Table 3 (S. 12) shows the share of subgroups containing 
international actors (IO), European and Bologna-actors (EUB) or third state actors (TS) 
with regard to three governance instruments: financial means, discursive dissemination 
and regulation. 
To give an example of reading: In the transaction network of Germany during the 
first period of time 25% of the identified subgroups contained European and Bologna-
actors whereas there were no cliques containing international organizations or third 
states. In the second period of time, however, the share of European actors has some-
what lowered while third states form part of three out of eight cliques. These results 
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might reflect the ostentatious withdrawal of European actors from the implementation 
of the Bologna-Process and the subsequent consolidation of its intergovernmental plat-
form.  
Table 3: Clique membership of international actors 
Country Transaction Symbolic Affirmation Control 
Governance 
Instrument 
Financial Means/  
‘carrot’ 
Discursive  
Dissemination/ ‘sermon’ Regulation/‘stick’ 
Time period P1 P2 P1 P2 P1 P2 
D EUB: 25 % EUB: 13 % TS: 38 % 
IO: 9 % 
EUB: 46 % 
TS: 9 % 
IO: 29 % 
EUB: 36 % 
TS: 14 % 
-- -- 
CH   IO: 14 % TS: 14 % 
IO: 10 % 
EUB: 33 % 
TS: 33 % 
-- EUB: 17 % 
GB EUB: 17 % TS: 17 % EUB: 22 %  
EUB: 10 % 
TS: 10 % -- EUB: 20 % 
NZ TS: 14 % IO: 25 % TS: 13 % TS: 27 % 
IO: 18 % 
TS: 27 % -- TS: 25% 
 
At a first glance it becomes obvious that the prevalence of international, European or 
third-state actors in cohesive subgroups is highest in the network of symbolic affirma-
tion resembling governance instruments of discursive interaction, moderate in the net-
work of transaction resembling governance by financial means and lowest in the net-
work of control, resembling governance by regulation: Therefore the chance of interna-
tional and European organizations to participate in closed forums of national decision 
making depends on the binding or non-binding nature of the governance instruments in 
question. As a matter of course these results are in line with the strongly national or 
regional character of education as a policy domain: international actors are free to 
communicate and interfere via affirmative speech acts, may provide some financial sup-
port, but do not have formal regulative competencies of any kind. Nevertheless, the 
overall share of international, European and third-state actors in cohesive subgroups has 
increased from the first to the second period in all networks and all countries. It would, 
however, be premature to interpret this increase as a general trend of denationalisation. 
A closer look to the composition of subgroups promises evidence whether international 
actors have displaced national actors or if they have attached themselves to existing 
cliques (Genschel et al. 2008: 9-10). 
First of all number and size of subgroups varies with the governance instrument in 
question: In the network of symbolic affirmation there tend to be more and bigger 
cliques than in the network of transaction while the network of control exhibits only a 
few very small cliques. Again, discursive dissemination proves to be more inclusive and 
more diversified whereas governance by financial means and regulation are more exclu-
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sive and specialised. Obviously, the transfer of money and orders is institutionally more 
demanding than the exchange of affirmative speech-acts. If we look at the composition 
of subgroups the growing participation of international actors takes place as an attach-
ment rather than displacement. E.g., in the German network of symbolic affirmation 
European and third-state actors as well as interest groups of universities, students and 
QA-agencies form clear-cut ‘Bologna-cliques’ in the second period of time. Yet, these 
new forums do by no means replace the national interaction between universities, stu-
dents and ministries. Hence, internationalization seems to foster policy-
entrepreneurship rather than crowding out. Moreover, the German case shows a change 
of patterns in the interaction between international actors and national state actors: In 
the first period there are five out of 11 cliques that brought together international or 
European actors and executive actors of the national or regional level. In the second 
period there is just one even though the total number of subgroups has increased. From 
a perspective of denationalisation such evidence might point to a successful emancipa-
tion of international actors from forums under national domination. A more conserva-
tive interpretation would focus on an exclusion of international actors in the course of 
national and regional actors closing ranks against exterior interference. 
A laager of veto-players against internationalisation? If we take a look at the network 
of transaction the opposite trend is to be seen: at first international actors stick to clear-
cut grants for research and student mobility, in the second period of time, however, they 
form part of bigger transaction cliques made up by international, national and regional 
actors as well as interest groups of universities and research agencies. Instead of exclu-
sion or emancipation of international organizations we observe a consolidation of a 
common sphere of political interaction with regard to relations of transaction in Ger-
many and Great Britain. In New Zealand there are no international actors involved in 
cohesive subgroups of transaction in the first period, but quite a number of international 
organizations linked with national state actors in the second period. Finally, in Switzer-
land we could not account for any participation of international actors in relations of 
transaction in the first or in the latter period of time. Altogether, these results support 
our theoretical considerations that Great Britain and Germany are more exposed to gov-
ernance by international organizations (here: governance by financial means) than Swit-
zerland and New Zealand. At the same time the case of New Zealand suggests that it is 
not membership in a number of international organizations alone which makes up for a 
higher impact of these organizations, but also national traditions of higher (New Zea-
land) or lower (Switzerland) openness towards international impulses. 
Finally, the network of control exhibits only a few cliques which are mainly domi-
nated by national (Great Britain) and regional veto-players (Germany; Switzerland). In 
New Zealand there are no subgroups of control at all in the first period. These results 
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indicate the ultimate responsibility of national states in the policy field of education. 
They support our theoretical assumption that education policy making is more immedi-
ate and centralised in Great Britain and Switzerland and more mediate and decentralised 
in the federal systems of Germany and Switzerland. Structural changes in the second 
period appear to be marginal compared to the networks of symbolic affirmation and 
transaction: in all countries there is an expansion of cliques on the national level which 
brings along a slight trend of nationalisation in the federal systems. In Great Britain and 
New Zealand QA-agencies gain considerable importance, which may be an expression 
of the more market-oriented understanding of education in these countries empowering 
independent quality assurance. Altogether, national and regional veto-players remain 
key regulators and are widely uncontested by international or private actors.  
Subgroup analysis provides insights as to whether, how and to what extent interna-
tional actors have succeeded in entering closed forums of decision making. Generally, 
international actors have managed to broaden their participation in all countries and 
with respect to all governance instruments thus accounting for an overall expansion of 
international governance in the field of education (i). Nevertheless, the potential for 
further intervention heavily depends on the hard or soft nature of the governance in-
strument in question: While international actors have become well established with re-
gard to discursive dissemination and while they have been moderately included into 
governance by financial means they remain mere onlookers in the field of standard set-
ting and formal regulation. Summed up briefly: international actors are allowed to talk 
and fund, but not to regulate and administer (ii). Altogether, the increasing participation 
of international actors in cohesive subgroups of political interaction reflects a certain 
pattern of internationalisation: attachment and limited inclusion instead of displacement 
and emancipation (iii). In a comparative perspective clique analysis underlines our theo-
retical assumptions as to the impact of international actors and national constellation of 
decision making (iv) and we may account for a slightly (sigma-) convergent develop-
ment of countries regarding the growing participation of international actors in national 
forums of decision-making (v). 
While the concept of cliques depends on the internal relations between actors we 
may also account for the structural similarity of actors with regard to their external rela-
tions. In such an understanding two actors are alike as far as they have similar relations 
to others (Jansen 2003: 212-213). In contrast to cohesive subgroups similar positions in 
a policy network do not necessarily indicate mutual understanding or collective action. 
Instead, they may point to competition and antagonism arising from the structural ‘ex-
changebility’ of actors (ibid, 213). Table 4 displays the role (or function) of interna-
tional organizations and veto-players in a schematic way. 
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Table 4: Positional Change 
Country International Actors Veto-Player 
 
IO  EUB NSA FSA P/L 
Time P1 → P2 
Patterns of Change 
Network of Transaction 
D P → R S – S S – S P → S 0 →S2 Growing competition; EUB consolidate their position, IOs marginalized 
CH 0 – 0 0 – 0 S → S/P R/P → S/P R/P → S/P National consolidation; laager of veto-players 
GB 0 – 0 S – S S – S S – S 0 – 0 Continuous competition bet–ween EUB, NSA and FSA 
NZ 0 → R 0 – 0 S – S 0 – 0 0 – 0 Continuous national centralism 
Network of Symbolic Affirmation 
D R → S/P S/P → S2 S/P – S/P S/P – S/P S/P – S/P Emancipation of EUB/IO 
CH S → P S → S/P P/S → P P/S → P S → P National incorporation of IO; emancipation 
of EUB 
GB S → 0 P → 0 S → S/P P → P/S P → S/P Active exclusion of IO/EUB: crowding out 
NZ 0 → P/S 0 – 0 S/P → S 0 – 0 0 → S National consolidation; emancipation of IO 
Network of Control 
D P → 0 P → 0 P2 → S P2 → S 0 – 0 Recapture of national responsibility; skir-mish for national/federal competence 
CH S → S/P S → S/P S → S/P S → S/P P → S/P Ongoing competition  
GB 0 – 0 0 → S P/S → S S – S2 0 → S Growing competition; EUB consolidate their position, 
NZ 0 → S 0 – 0 S/P – S/P 0 – 0 S/P → S National consolidation; emancipation of IO 
Legend: S = Sender; R = Receiver; P = Processor; 0 = no participation; S2 or P2 = second block) 
The letters in the lines represent schematic roles which are attributed to an actor due to 
its position within the network. The letter “S” indicates a position of sending money, 
affirmative speech-acts or directions, while “R” marks a receiving position. The letter 
“P” represents a position of processing or brokerage, i.e. self-referential interaction be-
tween the actors within a block. Finally, “0” describes a position which is neither send-
ing, processing nor receiving. To give an example of reading: in the transaction network 
of Germany, European and Bologna actors as well as national actors used to be in a 
sending position while international organizations and federal state actors used to be 
processors of funds, whereas the participation of parties and legislative actors remained 
unclear. In the second period of time both federal state actors and legislative actors 
changed to become senders of funds while international organizations turned into re-
ceivers.  
Altogether, the German network of transaction exhibits a growing competition be-
tween international actors and national as well as regional veto-players in the field of 
governance by financial means. In the course of this contest European and Bologna ac-
tors manage to consolidate their position, e.g. by means of traditional education pro-
grammes, such as ERASMUS or COMENIUS, while international organizations take 
up a more passive position. The result is neither a laager of veto-players nor a viral in-
trusion by international actors, but the formation of a hybrid, pluralistic and competitive 
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sphere of governance by financial means. Taking a look at Switzerland, international 
and European organizations, along with some minor interest groups are neither provider 
nor drawee of funds. In contrast, federal and national veto-players manage to consoli-
date their position as active applicants of governance by financial means. Here, we have 
an ideal-typical example of veto-players who close ranks against internationalisation 
and thus deter international actors to gain ground. Relations of transaction in Great Brit-
ain are clustered quite similar to Germany with European, national and federal actors 
forming one block of providers whereas international organizations, such as the OECD 
are not involved in governance by financial means. In contrast to both Germany and 
Switzerland there is a striking continuity of roles and positions. Obviously, the competi-
tion between European, national and regional actors has been successfully institutional-
ised. Finally, in New Zealand there is but one actor in a steady position of sending 
money: national state actors. All other actors are either not involved or even become 
clients of the first. These results underline the centralistic setting of decision making in 
New Zealand. 
While there are both clear-cut positions and quite some continuity in the role struc-
ture of governance by financial means, governance by discursive dissemination seems 
to be more hybrid and fragmented in structural terms. In the German network of sym-
bolic affirmation veto-players appear to be both senders and processors of affirmative 
speech acts whereas international and European actors are subject to positional change: 
while international actors advance to be active participants in the national contest for 
discursive dissemination, European actors manage to acquire a unique selling proposi-
tion reflected by them forming an autonomous block of senders. This development can 
be taken for a successful emancipation of international actors. Positional changes in 
Switzerland exhibit a trend of integration or consolidation: while in the first period in-
ternational and legislative actors had formed a clear-cut block of senders they are now 
merged with national and cantonal state actors into a self-referential unit. At the same 
time, European actors, just like in Germany, go for a distinct, autonomous position of 
sending and processing affirmative speech-acts. The pattern of change can therefore be 
characterized as national incorporation and the emancipation of European actors. In 
Great Britain we could account for an antagonistic development of international actors 
and veto-players: while both international and European organizations lost their status 
of active participation in discursive dissemination veto-players have consolidated their 
position, a pattern that could be labelled as crowding out or active exclusion. Finally, in 
New Zealand national veto-players have reinforced their position as providers of legiti-
mizing speech-acts while at the same time international organizations managed to estab-
lish an own position of discursive intervention. This pattern of change may be charac-
terized as national consolidation combined with international emancipation. 
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In the network of control resembling governance by regulation there was a surprising 
degree of structural change. In Germany we observed two concurrent streams of 
change: international actors have lost their position as processors of directions (e.g. by 
giving mandates to QA-agencies by order of the national states) while at the same time 
national and federal veto-players have emerged from processors to issuers of directions. 
The recapture of national responsibility in the area of education therefore brings along 
an increasing competition between national and federal state actors, a process well to be 
seen in the German ‘Föderalismusreform’; after all, renationalisation is the cradle of 
national concupiscence. In contrast, relations of control in Switzerland are marked by a 
continuous structural similarity of international actors and veto-players. Thus, there is 
an ongoing competition of international or European guidelines imposed on schools or 
universities and cantonal or national regulation in the classical sense. More change and 
differentiation is to be seen in Great Britain: Here, European actors and national veto 
players compete for the allegiance of research institutions and QA-agencies while re-
gional authorities administer distinct responsibilities and international organizations are 
not part of the game. Finally, the policy network of New Zealand exhibits minor 
changes with regard to governance by regulation: national state actors can preserve their 
regulative position, but on their part become subject to mandates by legislative actors 
and international organizations. 
Altogether, positional analysis has revealed a significant change in the structural 
roles of both international organizations and veto-players in all countries, i.e. the impact 
and interplay of international and domestic actors changes in the course of internation-
alization of education politics. While international organizations, such as the OECD, are 
strong in the field of discursive dissemination, unsurprisingly they play a less active role 
with regard to governance by financial means or regulation (with the important excep-
tion of New Zealand). In contrast, European and Bologna-actors become structurally 
similar to domestic actors, which is an expression of increasing competition (ii). This 
structural assimilation of European actors is particularly visible in Germany and Great 
Britain, which is in line with our assumptions about the relevance of IO-membership. At 
the same time we can account for a moderate yet visible impact of European and Bolo-
gna-actors in Switzerland despite of it not being a member of the European Union. Ob-
viously, the geographical and cultural proximity as well as the Bologna-Process as an 
intergovernmental ‘transmission belt’ creates an opportunity structure for European 
intervention (iii). Finally, in the whole period of observation domestic veto-players have 
kept their position as crucial providers and processors of funds, regulations and political 
legitimacy. This holds true for the more decentralised and federalist systems such as 
Germany and Switzerland as well as for the more centralised systems of Great Britain 
and New Zealand (iv). Therefore, there is quite a bit of positional change in the policy 
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networks which brings along an increasing participation of international actors. Yet, 
these actors do by no means displace the domestic sphere of decision-making, but rather 
find themselves attached or incorporated (v). 
The analysis of subgroups and positions yields qualitative evidence as to the roles 
and social location of international actors and veto-players, but is does not allow for a 
quantitative assessment whether the actual impact of the international sphere has in-
creased or not. In the following subsection we will therefore address changes of promi-
nence of international actors with regard to their respective governance instruments. 
Important Actors  
In this last empirical section we assess the activity of international actors on the level of 
single actors. A basic index to characterize an actors´ activity in a policy-network is the 
degree-centrality, i.e. the number of out- and ingoing relations. In the following, the 
centrality of an actor reflects his chance to influence other actors in the policy network. 
Table 5 lists the ranks of international and European actors weighted by the number of 
outgoing relations and so their exertion of influence on national policy-making.3   
Table 5: Sending ranks of international actors 
Country Measures D CH GB NZ 
IO 0 6 5 7 0 11 0 7 Symbolic affirmation 
EUB 3 5 7 11 3 8 0 10 
IO 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 Transaction 
EUB 8 3 0 0 4 6 0 6 
IO 3 0 4 7 0 0 0 5 Power 
EUB 0 0 4 4 0 5 0 0 
 
First of all, two basic results are noticeable: There is evidence of IO-governance in all 
national policy networks and there are considerable differences between the countries. 
At a first glance, the characteristics of IO-governance instruments strongly affect their 
application to influence national education politics: While governance by discursive 
dissemination seems to be frequently used by international and European actors, stan-
dard setting as mode of governance is more exclusive. Symbolic interaction appears to 
be a more easily applicable strategy for international actors (here: governance by discur-
sive dissemination), even though the impact of this soft instrument is rather uncertain 
due to its noncommittal character. Taking a closer look at the intensity of governance it 
appears to be in line with our case selection, e.g. the relatively high exposure to interna-
tional organizations in Germany and Great Britain is reflected in a moderate degree of 
                                                 
3
  If two actors have the same outdegree-centrality, the saldo between in- and outdegree was taken into account.  
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influence in the first period. Subsequently, New Zealand’s policy network does not ex-
ert any influence by IO-governance whereas Switzerland appears to be a deviant case as 
there is a considerable activity by international and European actors. This leads to the 
assumption that due to the geographical position of Switzerland amidst member states 
of the EU and OECD there are interventions in the national decision-making processes. 
Regarding governance by international organizations the German policy network 
shows an increase in the network of symbolic affirmation, i.e. there is a change in the 
significance of organizations such as the OECD. As a result, the formation of symbolic 
alliances initialized by international organizations as well as discursive benefits can be 
observed. To illustrate this noncommittal mode of governance, the following retrieval 
gives a brief impression: “We (OECD) fully agree with the statement of the largest 
teacher trade union GEW that ‘teachers’ professional identity is defined by quality” 
(OECD 2004: 44). Stressing a basic accordance with the position of the Labour Union 
GEW, this statement of the OECD creates a discursive coalition and thus has an impact 
on the decision-making process in Germany. If we take a look at the ranks of interna-
tional organizations in the other two networks, we observe a distinct decrease of gov-
ernance by transaction and standard setting: obviously, there is a discursive turn in gov-
ernance by international organizations in the German policy network. On the contrary, 
European actors are able to gain significance in the network of transaction while their 
discursive impulses in the policy network decline. A glance at the list of retrievals 
shows that this reflects the enhancements of the Bologna-Process, switching from a pe-
riod of agenda setting to implementation.  
In our case selection Switzerland represents a country with a high number of veto-
players and a low degree of exposure to international organizations. Nevertheless, inter-
national and European actors show a high potential of influence in governance by dis-
cursive dissemination and standard setting at first. Over time, however, there is a de-
crease of activity by international and European actors in all modes of governance, ex-
cept from a constant level of influence of European actors in the network of power rela-
tions. Considering the autonomy and neutrality of Switzerland this evidence seems to be 
counter-intuitive. In fact, the list of retrievals shows that these power relations are rela-
ted to the Swiss participation in the Bologna-Process, as the following sample exempli-
fies: “Demnach sind auch die vorliegenden Richtlinien für die koordinierte Erneuerung 
der Lehre an den universitären Hochschulen der Schweiz im Rahmen des Bologna-
Prozesses […] für die Vertragspartner der Zusammenarbeitsvereinbarung, d.h. den 
Bund und die Universitätskantone, verbindlich (SUK 2003: 2).4 By signing the Bolo-
                                                 
4
  „Thus, the present Guidelines for the coordinated modernization of teaching at the Swiss Universities in the 
context of the Bologna-Process [...] are obligatory for the contractual partners of the cooperation agreement, i.e. 
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gna-declaration in 1999, the policy network in Switzerland inevitably opened up chan-
nels of interaction for impulses from European actors, e.g the Bologna Guidelines of 
2003 and the corresponding recommendations for accreditation of the Rectors´ Confer-
ence of the Swiss Universities (CRUS). However, if we consider the results of subgroup 
analysis, international actors do not replace the powerful veto-players in Switzerland: 
They solely act as additional actors in the federal structure of decision-making.  
Similar to Switzerland, European Actors seem to be the key actors in Great Britain. 
Moreover, there appears to be an analogue effect as in the German and in the Swiss pol-
icy network: While European Actors sustain their influence in the network of transac-
tion and they even gain significance in the network of power relations, their discursive 
governance activity declines. Again, the character of the governance instruments 
changed over time due to the developing education policy in the EU, amongst others in 
the context of the Bologna-Process. For instance, in the British political interaction we 
found several retrievals mentioning funding by the European Union, e.g. in the context 
of the sixth Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development 
(FP6). In contrast, international organizations, such as the OECD, play a less significant 
role in the British political interaction as we observe only a minor increase in govern-
ance by discursive dissemination. This evidence leads to the assumption, that EU gov-
ernance overshadows the political discourse in Great Britain whereas governance of 
international organizations is either nonexistent or non-mentioned. Hence, the member-
ship in international organizations does not inevitably lead to high governance activity 
in political interaction.  
Finally, an observation of the activity of international actors in New Zealand pro-
vides clear-cut evidence: International organizations as well as European actors inten-
sify their interventions in national policy-making distinctly, i.e. from no governance to 
influential actors in the second period. Moreover, this ‘boost of governance’ concerns 
almost all instruments, only European Actors still have no capability to influence in 
terms of power relations. Taking a closer look at the list of retrievals, we find a broad 
set of international and European Actors, from the OECD and UNESCO to the World 
Bank to the European Commission. Most of the retrievals are results of common pro-
jects, e.g. a UNESCO-ASPAC conference in Wellington 2006, which aimed to improve 
the management of the education systems as well as to promote a mutual recognition of 
degrees, diplomas and certificates in the Asia Pacific Region. A funding of the 
UNESCO “was provided to cover the Congress´ infrastructural costs (venue, functions, 
interpretation, equipment, printing, communications etc.), as well as international travel 
and accommodation for participants” (Ministry of Education 2007: 146). In addition, 
                                                                                                                                               
the Federal Authorities and the University Cantons”, Translation P.K.. 
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European actors appear in the political interaction of New Zealands as well, exemplarily 
shown by the following excerpt concerning the LEONARDO programme: “The pro-
gramme will be jointly funded by Tertiary Education Commission (TEC) and the Euro-
pean Commission, with participating institutions also making a small contribution”. 
Maurice Maxwell, Head of the European Delegation in Wellington comments the pur-
pose of such programmes as follows: “This pilot programme will further strengthen the 
ties between the European Union and New Zealand and potentially serve as a model for 
the future cooperation in higher education”.5 Referring to our theoretical assumptions, 
the results for governance by European and Bologna actors are quite surprising, as we 
classified New Zealand as a country only exposed to the OECD. On the other hand, 
there is only a small number of veto-players and thus a more centralised structure of 
decision-making. Along with a traditional openness to external impulses the political 
system of New Zealand offers a fertile ground for governance by international and 
European actors. 
The previous section aimed at exploring the variances in the appearance of interna-
tional actors in all four countries. Besides mere description, systematic pair comparisons 
provide an added value of network analysis since they may allow us to explain similari-
ties and differences regarding the case selection. To recapitulate the theoretical assump-
tions: We expected a high activity of international actors in Germany and Great Britain 
due to their memberships in international organizations. We further expected a high 
stability of decision-making structures in Germany and Switzerland as they are coun-
tries with a high number of veto-players.  
A first pair comparison refers to the number of veto-players: Overall, there is evi-
dence that the activity of international actors declines in the federalist systems with de-
centralised structures of decision-making. This result is in line with the above made 
observation that strong veto-players tend to superpose the role of international actors. 
Taking up the idea of viral intrusion vs. building a laager it seems that the first domestic 
barriers are build by veto-players: Former existing vertical channels of interaction be-
tween the national and international sphere trickle away, and political interaction is re-
captured as a national affair. At first, such an evidence is not related to the question of 
change in national policy making, since there can also be long-term interaction effects 
between international and national actors. E.g., if we look at QA-agencies in Switzer-
land, their role in Swiss education politics changed clearly in the context of Higher 
Education as they became powerful actors in the implementation of the Bologna-
Guidelines. In contrast, governance by international actors in countries with a smaller 
number of veto-players (Great Britain and New Zealand) exhibits more heterogeneous 
                                                 
5
  http://www.beehive.govt.nz/node/21396, 03-10-2009. 
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changes. While there is a change of governance by European Actors, switching from 
discursive modes to standard setting and transaction in the British policy network, the 
influence of international as well as European Actors increases significantly in New 
Zealand. Nevertheless, there is an overall tendency to an increasing activity of govern-
ance by international and European Actors. With regard to the lack of veto-players in 
these countries this result shows the susceptibility of centralised decision making struc-
tures to international impulses.   
Besides the number of veto-players, another pair comparison refers to the degree of 
exposure to international organizations. Here, we examine effects resulting from mem-
berships in international organizations. Germany and Great Britain represent countries 
which are members both of the OECD and the EU: While the influence of international 
and European Actors declines in Germany, there is more of an increase in Great Britain. 
On the other hand the comparison between Switzerland and New Zealand as countries 
less exposed to international organizations shows a contrary effect: The results exhibit a 
decrease of governance in the Swiss policy network while international organizations 
gain influence in New Zealand. Similar to the analysis on the macro-level the results 
indicate that the variation within the pairs is higher than between them. Hence, there is 
no clear-cut evidence in this second pair comparison that points to a systematic correla-
tion between the degree of exposure to and activity of international organizations.  
Summing it up, even though we can not exhibit an overall expansion of governance 
there are significant changes in the activity of international actors. Overall, international 
organizations, such as the OECD, increasingly apply discursive strategies to influence 
national structures of decision-making, while they hardly use financial means and stan-
dard setting (i). This emphasizes the character of the policy field of education as a 
highly sensitive element of national policy-making, which requires just as sensitive in-
struments. European and Bologna actors, however, possess a broader set of governance 
instruments, including funding and standard setting (ii). Moreover, there was evidence 
that the existence of powerful veto-players in a policy network strongly affects the ac-
tivity of international actors as we observed a decrease of governance in Germany and 
Switzerland. Despite processes of internationalisation policy networks do not inevitably 
open up channels of interaction (iii). In contrast, a small number of veto-players and a 
centralised structure of decision making appear to be a fertile ground for international 
impulses to bear fruit (iv). 
CONCLUSION 
In the previous sections we pursued a comparative analysis of education policy net-
works to study patterns and mechanisms of internationalisation of education politics in 
Germany, Switzerland, Great Britain, and New Zealand. To this end, we examined po-
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litical interaction between international and European organizations, national and re-
gional veto-players as well as interest groups of various kinds on three different levels: 
On the macro-level we focussed on structural change in the patterns and modes of po-
litical interaction, whereas on the meso-level we sought for insights into positional 
change. On the micro-level, finally, we explored governance activities of international 
and European actors and hence changes in the prominence of individual actors. As a 
result, we found considerable variation across (rather than within) countries on all levels 
of observation. While network analysis is well suited for the systematic description of 
structural changes of various kinds its results must be related to our theoretical frame-
work and sampling in order to reach explanations as to the impact of international or-
ganizations and domestic veto-players on national education policy making. 
Here, we assumed that international organizations may trigger change in national 
policy making by a set of governance instruments. The intensity and direction of change 
can be hindered or fostered by domestic veto-players. As independent variable govern-
ance by international and European actors represents a driving force towards conver-
gence of national education policy making. Our study has brought about evidence for 
different levels of IO-governance in the four countries. The participation of IOs heavily 
depends on the governance instrument applied: E.g. they are most prominently engaged 
in governance by discursive dissemination since it is non-committal and not bound to 
any formal prescriptions. Yet, governance activities of international actors differ be-
tween international organizations, such as the OECD and European and Bologna actors 
as well as across countries. Table 6 provides a comparative overview of central patterns 
of change.    
Table 6: IO-Impact, Patterns of Change 
 Germany Switzerland Great Britain New Zealand 
IO Discursive turn Withdrawal Marginal discursive 
appearance Overall enlargement 
EUB From argument to 
action 
From argument to 
action 
From argument to 
action Overall enlargement 
 
While European and Bologna actors are able to make use of soft as well as hard modes 
of governance, international organizations have proved to be restricted to soft govern-
ance, such as discursive dissemination in all countries. With regard to the exposure to 
international organizations, the policy networks in Germany and Great Britain exhibit 
some similar characteristics. On the one hand, there are mainly discursive impulses by 
international organizations such as the OECD, on the other hand governance by Euro-
pean and Bologna-actors represents collective action, e.g. funding and standard setting. 
Additionally, these actors become structurally similar to domestic players which points 
to our theoretical assumptions concerning the relevance of IO-membership. On the con-
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trary, the results of the other countries are more heterogeneous as New Zealand appears 
to be an exceptional case. Although we expected a lower degree of IO activity we ob-
served an overall enlargement of governance in the policy network of New Zealand. In 
Switzerland we found evidence for a withdrawal of international organizations, i.e. a 
decrease of governance which may be attributed to the high number of veto-players. 
However, similar to the other participants of the Bologna-Process the governance activ-
ity of European and Bologna-actors shows a turn from argument to collective action. 
This leads to the question how national structures of decision-making cope with im-
pulses by international organizations.    
Obviously, domestic veto-players make extensive use of their potential to mediate in-
ternational stimuli. In their position as ‘doormen’ of their countries they may either em-
bed international organizations in, or exclude them from political interaction. Hence, 
national transformation capacities represent the intervening variable in our theoretical 
model. If we take a look at the structural roles of veto-players in their respective policy-
networks, i.e. national and federal actors as well as parties and legislative actors, we 
find different strategies to mediate IO-governance. Based on the results of positional 
analysis, Table 7 provides a brief overview. 
Table 7: Veto-players, Patterns of change 
Symbolic  
affirmation 
National  
consolidation 
National  
Consolidation 
Active exklusion 
of IOs and EUB 
National  
consolidation 
Transaction Growing  Competition 
Laager of  
veto-players 
Continuous  
competition 
(national)  
centralism 
Power 
Recapture of  
national  
responsibility 
Ongoing  
competition 
Growing  
competition 
National  
consolidation 
 
In general, we found evidence that in all countries veto-players have kept their position 
as crucial providers and processors of political resources such as financial means, regu-
lations or legitimacy. Despite of their remarkable stability within the countries there is 
quite some variation of veto-players and their respective positions across countries. E.g., 
in the German and Swiss policy network we found spheres of national consolidation 
(network of symbolic affirmation), but also competition, recapture and even laagers of 
veto-players (networks of transaction and power). In short, federal systems tend to react 
with various strategies to cope with IO-governance, heavily depending on the respective 
political resource. Countries with a small number of veto-players, by contrast, appear 
either not to have or not to apply as many different strategies. E.g. the positions of veto-
players in the British policy network can rather be characterised by competition whereas 
there is more of a consolidation in New Zealand. To summarize, as expected national 
transformation capacities are crucial for analyzing processes of change since we ob-
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served various positions of veto-players. In our sample veto-players take up ambivalent 
positions between more active roles, as, for instance, in the Swiss policy network, or 
more passive roles as in New Zealand. However, as mentioned above these actors do by 
no means give up their central status in the policy networks, neither in centralised po-
litical systems nor in decentralised.   
Obviously, strategies of domestic veto-players to react to international interference 
are just as manifold as the governance instruments applied by international actors. Their 
respective impact, however, can only be judged by a comparative examination of 
change in national education politics (dependent variable). A comparison of structural 
change in national education policy networks has pointed to stability rather than change. 
Moreover, variation between the countries has proved to be higher than within. With 
regard to our theoretical framework the modes of political interaction seem to depend 
on domestic structures of decision-making (veto-players) rather than membership in 
international organizations. Despite such evidence of path-dependency and continuity, 
we could observe differences in the degree of change with respect to intensity (density) 
and internal structuration (centralisation):     
Table 8: National edcuation politcs, Degree of change 
 D CH GB NZ 
Intensity  Moderate change Little change High change Moderate change 
Structuration More change Little change More change Little change 
 
The changes in the intensity of political interaction are perfectly in line with the assump-
tions guiding our theoretical sampling: The British policy network seems to be most 
affected by processes of internationalisation due to its high exposure to international 
organizations and its small number of veto-players. On the contrary, the Swiss policy 
network exhibits only little change. Finally, we observed moderate change in Germany 
and New Zealand where there is a balance between international organizations and do-
mestic veto-players. Yet, a glance at the internal structuration of the policy networks 
yields to more heterogeneous results. There are tendencies to centralize political interac-
tion in the German and British policy network while network centralization in Switzer-
land and New Zealand remains relatively stable. Thus, even if international actors are 
able to claim legitimate interference, for instance, due to a countries membership, IO-
governance does not inevitably lead to an expansion and openness of political interac-
tion.  
This paper was guided by a descriptive as well as an explanative intention. In the 
previous sections we provided descriptive insights into general modes of education pol-
icy making in Germany, Switzerland, Great Britain and New Zealand and their devel-
opment within the last decade (structural change). Moreover, we explored coalitions and 
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positions of structural equivalence to account for roles or functions of international ac-
tors and domestic veto-players and to examine positional change. Finally, we displayed 
the significance of international actors in national education policy networks to account 
for gains or losses in prominence. To make explanative use of our results we pursued 
pair comparisons guided by theoretical sampling: While Germany and Switzerland are 
structurally similar due to their federal systems and hence a bigger number of veto play-
ers, Great Britain and Germany are marked by a potentially higher exposure to interna-
tional actors as they are members of the OECD and the EU. It is one of our key findings 
that the effect of veto-players superposes the effect of IO-governance. In most countries 
there is indeed an internationalization of education politics taking place in the sense of 
an increasing participation of international actors who apply a more and more diversi-
fied portfolio of governance instruments. However, such intervention does not remain 
uncontested as domestic veto players develop a rich set of strategies to cope, compete or 
collaborate with international actors. It appears to be just like in Aesop´s famous tale 
about the Hare and the Tortoise: the hare may be more agile than his competitor, but the 
tortoise always seems to be ahead making use of its lookalike kinsfolk. Within the last 
decade national education policy networks have become more inclusive to international 
actors, yet we are far from any sort of international hegemony or denationalisation. The 
internationalisation of education politics has taken place as a process of attachment 
rather than displacement. The ongoing prominence of national and regional veto players 
leads to path-dependency rather than convergence of actors and processes in national 
decision making. At the same time international actors may use their new closeness to 
the national policy domain to launch changes in education policies. 
REFERENCES 
Bache, Ian and Matthew Flinders (2004) ‘Themes and Issues in Multi-level Governance’, in Bache, Ian 
and Matthew Flinders (ed.) Multi-level Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-11. 
Berlin-Communiqué (2003) ‘”Realising the European Higher Education Area”. Communiqué of the 
Conference of Ministers responsible for Higher Education in Berlin on 19 September 2003’ (Online: 
http://www.ond.vlaanderen.be/hogeronderwijs/bologna/documents/MDC/Berlin_Communique1.pdf, 
last access: 03-10-2009). 
Braun, Dietmar (2004) ‘Education, Science and Cultural Policy’, in Kloeti, Ulrich, Peter Knoepfel, 
Hanspeter Kriesi, Wolf Linder and Yannis Papadopoulos (ed.) Handbook of Swiss Politics, Zürich: 
NZZ, 743-76. 
Burth, Hans-Peter and Petra Starzmann (2001) ‘Der Beitrag des Theoriemodells Strukturelle Kopplung 
zur instrumententheoretischen Dimension in der Policyanalyse’, in Burth, Hans-Peter and Axel 
Görlitz (ed.) Politische Steuerung in Theorie und Praxis, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 49-75. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 103) 
- 27 - 
Feld, Scott L. (1997) ‘Structural embeddedness and stability of interpersonal relations’, Social Networks 
19 (1), 91-5. 
Genschel, Philipp, Stephan Leibfried and Bernhard Zangl (2008) ‘Der zerfasende Staat. Vom Wandel des 
Subjekts moderner Politik’, vorgänge (2), 4-13. 
Howlett, Michael and M. Ramesh (1993) ‘Policy-Instrumente, Policy-Lernen und Privatisierung: 
Theoretische Erklärungen für den Wandel in der Instrumentenwahl’, in Héritier, Adrienne (ed.) 
Policy-Analyse. Kritik und Neuorientierung, Opladen: VS, 245-64. 
Jansen, Dorothea (2003) Einführung in die Netzwerkanalyse. 2 ed, Opladen: Leske+Budrich. 
Knoke, David, Franz U. Pappi, Jeffrey Broadbent and Yutaka Tsujinaka (1996) Comparing Policy 
Networks. Labor Politics in the U.S., Germany, and Japan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Laumann, Edward O. and David Knoke (1987) The Organizational State. Social Change in National 
Policy Domains, Madison: Wisconsin University Press. 
Leuze, Kathrin, Tilman Brand, Anja P. Jakobi, Kerstin Martens, Alexander-Kenneth Nagel, Alessandra 
Rusconi and Ansgar Weymann. 2008. Analysing the Two-Level Game. International and National 
Determinants of Change in Education Policy Making. Bremen. 
Leuze, Kathrin, Kerstin Martens and Alessandra Rusconi (2007) ‘New Arenas in Education Governance - 
The Impact of International Organizations and Markets on Education Policy Making’, in Leuze, 
Kathrin, Kerstin Martens and Alessandra Rusconi (ed.) New Arenas of Education Governance - The 
Impact of International Organizations and Markets on Educational Policy Making, Houndmills, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, 3-15. 
Ministry of Education (2007) ‘The Annual Report of the Ministry of Education Te Tāhuhu o Te 
Mātauranga for the year ended 30 June 2007’ (Online: http://www.minedu.govt.nz/~/media/MinEdu/ 
Files/TheMinistry/AnnualReport0833.pdf, last access: 03-10-2009). 
Nagel, Alexander-Kenneth (2006) Der Bologna-Prozess als Politiknetzwerk. Akteure, Beziehungen, 
Perspektiven, Wiesbaden: DUV. 
Nagel, Alexander-Kenneth. 2008. Analysing Change in International Politics. A Semiotic Method of 
Structural Connotation. Bremen. 
Nagel, Alexander-Kenneth (2009, in print) ‘International Networks in Education Politics’, in Jakobi, 
Anja, Kerstin Martens and Klaus Dieter Wolf (ed.) Education in Political Science. Discovering a 
Neglected Field, Routledge,  
OECD (2004) ‘Attracting, Developing and Retaining Effective Teachers Country Note: Germany’ 
(Online: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/48/33732207.pdf, last access: 03-10-2009). 
Seibel, Wolfgang and Jörg Raab (2003) ‘Verfolgungsnetzwerke. Zur Messung von Arbeitsteilung und 
Machtdifferenzen in den Verfolgungsapparaten des Holocaust’, Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und 
Sozialpsychologie 55 (3), 197-230. 
Suitor, Jill J., Barry Wellmann and David L. Morgan (1997) ‘It’s about time: how, why, and when 
networks change’, Social Networks 19 (1), 1-7. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 103) 
- 28 - 
SUK (2003) ‘Kommentar zu den Bologna-Richtlinien zuhanden der Universitätskantone’ (Online: 
http://www.diz.ethz.ch/projects/abgeschlossene_projekte/master4/dokumente/Kommentar_Richtlinien
_SUK_2003.pdf, 03-10-2009., last access: 03-10-2009). 
Wasserman, Stanley and Katherine Faust (2007) Social network analysis. Methods and Applications, 
Cambridge. 
Wellmann, Barry, Renita Yuk-lin Wong, David Tindall and Nancy Nazer (1997) ‘A decade of network 
change: turnover, persistence and stability in personal communities’, Social Networks 19 (1), 27-50. 
Wolf, Frieder (2006) ‘Bildungspolitik: Föderale Vielfalt und gesamtstaatliche Vermittlung’, in Schmidt, 
Manfred and Reimut Zohlnhöfer (ed.) Regieren in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Wiesbaden: VS, 
221-41. 
 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 103) 
- 29 - 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
Alexander K. Nagel is assistant professor at the International Consortium for Research 
in the Humanities (IGKF) and the Center for Religious Studies (CERES), University 
Bochum. 
 
Telephone:  +49 234 322 2314 
E-Mail: Alexander-kenneth.nagel@rub.de 
Address: Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsstraße 150,  
D 44780 Bochum 
 
Philipp Knodel is a research fellow at the Collaborative Research Center “Transforma-
tions of the State”, University of Bremen. 
Telephone:  +49 421 218 8728 
E-Mail: Philipp.knodel@sfb597.uni-bremen.de 
Address: University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center “Transfor-
mations of the State“, Linzer Strasse 9a, D 28359 Bremen 
 
